

# The Unbreakable One-Time Pad Cipher

**Frank Rubin**

Excerpted from

**SECRET KEY  
CRYPTOGRAPHY**

**M A N N I N G**

# One-Time Pad

- A cipher which combines a **message key** with a **plaintext** message to produce a **ciphertext**.
- The key stream is the **same length as the message**, one character of key for each character of plaintext.
- The key stream is **unpredictable**, also called **cryptographically secure**. Given part of the key stream, an opponent cannot determine any other part of the key stream. (This is **not** the same as random!)

# History


Invented by Frank Miller, a banker from Sacramento CA, in 1882.



Contract    60401    Plaintext  
              +    372    Key  
              60773    Ciphertext

# One-Time Pad device

Invented by Gilbert S. Vernam of AT&T in 1918.



# Key Tape

- 1000 characters long
- Produced by a person using a (forerunner of) Friden Flexowriter
- Not very random, mostly letters
- Had to be delivered or transmitted in clear
- Tapes got reused, with different starting points
- Later version had 2 tapes, 999 and 1000

# One-Time (paper) Pads

Invented by Werner Kunze of the German  
Pers Z S (Signal Intelligence Agency)  
around 1922. Decimal,  
using non-carrying addition.

Invented independently by the British about  
1926.

# Practical problem

The difficulty with the One-Time Pad is that you need as much key material as the total length of all messages sent and received -- plus reserves for future use and sending messages twice.

## **What happens when you run out?**

If you send additional keys, they need to be enciphered, which requires as much extra key material as the total of all keys sent, *ad infinitum*.

# Random Number Generators

- True random numbers
  - \* Cosmic rays, nuclear decay, thermal noise
  - \* Nature photos: trees, pebbles, flocks of birds, crashing waves
  - \* Manmade: traffic, rushing people, paint splatters, keystrokes
- Too slow
- Overkill

# Pseudorandom number generators

- Multiplicative congruential

$$X_n = aX_{n-1} \bmod p$$

- Linear congruential

$$X_n = (aX_{n-1} + b) \bmod N$$

- Chained addition

$$X_n = (X_{n-1} + X_{n-s}) \bmod N$$

- Chained XOR

$$X_n = X_{n-1} \oplus X_{n-s}$$

- Xorshift - Marsaglia  
Shift and XOR
- FRand  
Chained XOR with cyclic shifts
- Linear feedback shift register  
$$X_n = X_{n-1} \oplus X_{n-s}$$
- Mersenne twister

# Multiplicative congruential generator

$$X_n = aX_{n-1} \pmod{p}$$

$p$  is a prime

$a$  is a primitive root of  $p$

$a, a^2, a^3, \dots, a^{p-1} \pmod{p}$  are distinct, that is, they are a permutation of  $1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1$

- Use  $\lfloor 256X_n/p \rfloor$  as the random byte (not  $X_n \pmod{256}$ )

# Wrong Way

Suppose you take 5 multiplicative congruential generators,  $S$ ,  $G_0$ ,  $G_1$ ,  $G_2$  and  $G_3$ . Use the *selector*  $S$  to generate a 2-bit pseudorandom number and use that to choose one of  $G_0\dots G_3$  to produce the next random byte. Assuming  $p=2^{31}-1$ , this gives you an effective key size of  $5 \times 31 = 155$  bits.

**That does not work.** At least one of  $G_0\dots G_3$  will have 5 outputs among the next 17 output bytes. That's only 6188 possibilities. You can try them all. Only a small fraction of seeds will make all 5 of the corresponding plaintext characters be letters.

Once you have identified the positions for one of the  $G_0\dots G_3$ , there are only 1287 possible positions for the next generator.

# Key Size

Suppose you choose  $p=2^{31}-1$ . This gives you a 31-bit key. If you use 4 such multiplicative generators, you have an effective key of  $4 \times 31 = 124$  bits, secure by today's standards.

You can combine the 4 pseudorandom bytes adding them or by XOR-ing them.

To prevent your opponent from solving the 4 generators by linear algebra, make the 4 multipliers and 4 moduli distinct.

$$X_n = a_i X_{n-1} \text{ mod } p_i \text{ for } i=1,2,3,4.$$

# Linear combination

As before, use 5 multiplicative congruential generators,  $S$ ,  $G_0$ ,  $G_1$ ,  $G_2$  and  $G_3$ .

Use high-order 16 bits of  $S$  to form four 4-bit coefficients,  $c_0$ ,  $c_1$ ,  $c_2$ , and  $c_3$ . At least one of them must be odd.

Use the linear combination  $(c_0X_0 + c_1X_1 + c_2X_2 + c_3X_3) \bmod 256$  as the random output byte.

Disadvantage: requires 5 pseudorandom numbers to produce each byte.

# Combining Functions

Combine a key byte  $K$  with a message byte  $M$ .  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$  are non-linear simple substitutions.

Up to now, everything was linear. A combining function can eliminate the linearity, and make it much harder for an opponent to determine any of the random outputs.

- **Addition.** Replace  $M$  by:  $K+M$ ,  $A(K)+M$ ,  $K+B(M)$ ,  $A(K)+B(M)$ ,  $C(K+M)$ ,  $C(A(K)+M)$ ,  $C(M+B(K))$ ,  $C(A(K)+B(M))$ .
- **XOR.** Replace  $M$  by:  $K\oplus M$ ,  $A(K)\oplus M$ ,  $K\oplus B(M)$ ,  $A(K)\oplus B(M)$ ,  $C(K\oplus M)$ ,  $C(A(K)\oplus M)$ ,  $C(K\oplus B(M))$ ,  $C(A(K)\oplus B(M))$ .
- Downside: setup time to mix the substitution alphabets.

# Summary

By combining multiple pseudorandom number generators, then combining that key byte non-linearly with the message byte, you can achieve a strong stream cipher which is effectively equivalent to the one-time pad, without needing any true random numbers.

